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Abstract 
This paper provides a new analysis of e-trust, trust occurring in digital contexts, 
among the artificial agents of a distributed artificial system. The analysis endorses a 
non-psychological approach and rests on a Kantian regulative ideal of a rational agent, 
able to choose the best option for itself, given a specific scenario and a goal to 
achieve.  
 The paper first introduces e-trust describing its relevance for the contemporary 
society and then presents a new theoretical analysis of this phenomenon. The analysis 
first focuses on an agent’s trustworthiness, this one is presented as the necessary 
requirement for e-trust to occur. Then, a new definition of e-trust as a second-order-
property of first-order relations is presented. It is shown that the second-order-
property of e-trust has the effect of minimising an agent’s effort and commitment in 
the achievement of a given goal. On this basis, a method is provided for the objective 
assessment of the levels of e-trust occurring among the artificial agents of a 
distributed artificial system.  
 
Keywords: artificial agent, artificial distributed system, e-trust, trust, trustworthiness. 
 
1. Introduction 
Trust is a widely diffused phenomenon, affecting many of our daily practises. It is the 
key to effective communication, interaction and cooperation in any kind of distributed 
system, including our society (Lagenspetz 1992). As Luhmann (Luhmann 1979) 
suggests, “a complete absence of trust would prevent even getting up in the morning”, 
(p. 4). It is because we trust the other parts of the system to work properly that we can 
delegate some of our tasks and may focus only on the activities that we prefer. As in 
Plato’s Republic, for example, one can trust other agents to defend the city and 
dedicate one’s time to studying philosophy. 
Although trust is largely recognised as an important issue in many fields of 
research, we still lack a satisfactory analysis. Moreover, in recent years, with the 
emergence of trust in digital contexts – known as e-trust – new theoretical problems 
have arisen.  
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 The debate focuses on two main issues: the definition and the management of 
trust and e-trust. While the definition of trust and e-trust is left to sociologists and 
philosophers, the management of their occurrences is a topic of research for ICT.  
 In digital contexts, like e-Bay or an artificial distributed system, all the 
interactions are mediated by digital devices and there is no space for direct and 
physical contacts. In the digital sphere moral and social pressures are also perceived 
differently than in real environments. These differences from the traditional context in 
which trust occurs give the raise to a major problem, that is “whether trust is affected 
by environmental features in such a way that it can only occur in non-digital 
environments, or it is mainly affected by features of the agents and their abilities, so 
that trust is viable even in digital contexts”, (Taddeo 2009) (p. 29). Those who argue 
against the case of e-trust, see Nissenbaum (Nissenbaum 2001) for example, suggest 
that the absence of physical interactions and of moral and social pressure in the digital 
context constitute an obstacle to the occurrence of trust, and that for this reason e-trust 
should not be considered as an occurrence of trust in digital contexts but as a different 
phenomenon. Despite their plausibility, the objections against e-trust can be rebutted 
(Taddeo 2009). Several accounts of e-trust consider this phenomenon as an 
occurrence of trust in digital environments, see for example (Weckert 2005), (Vries 
2006), (Seamons, Winslett et al. 2003), and  (Papadopoulou 2007). 
Trust and e-trust have been defined in different ways: as a probabilistic 
evaluation of trustworthiness in (Gambetta 1998) and (Castelfranchi and Falcone 
1998) as a relationship based on ethical norms (Tuomela and Hofmann 2003), and as 
an agent’s attitude in (Weckert 2005). Unfortunately, all these analyses focus only on 
the trustor’s beliefs, and so provide a partial explanation of the phenomenon, leaving 
many questions unanswered. These include, for example, what the effects of trust 
and e-trust on the involved agents’ behaviours are, for what reason an agent decides 
to trust, or the role of trust and e-trust in the development of social systems.  
The research for the management of trust and e-trust seeks to identify the 
necessary parameters for their emergence and to define a method for the objective 
assessment of the level of trust and e-trust occurring between two or more agents. 
This research often rests on theoretical analyses of trust and e-trust uncritically, thus 
inheriting their limits. It will therefore benefit from an analysis of trust and e-trust 
able to overcome these boundaries and to answer the questions described above. 
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This paper seeks to contribute to the debate by presenting a new analysis of e-
trust. This analysis rests on a Kantian regulative ideal of a rational agent, able to 
choose the best option for itself, given a specific scenario and a goal to achieve. E-
trust is considered a result of a rational choice that is expected to be convenient for 
the agent. This approach does not reduce the entire phenomenon of trust to a matter 
of pure rational choice but, in this paper, we shall be concerned with the specific 
occurrences of e-trust among artificial agents (AAs) of distributed systems. So, given 
this scenario, it is simply more realistic to consider these AAs to be designed (or at 
least designable) as fully rational. One might object that trust involves more than 
rational choice and that a model unable to consider other than rational aspects could 
not provide a satisfactory analysis of this phenomenon. This is correct and therefore I 
will show how the provided analysis can be extended to consider non-rational factors 
as well.  
Here is a summary of the paper. In section 2, I describe e-trust in general. In 
section 3, I analyse its foundation. In section 4, I present and defend a new definition 
of e-trust. In section 4.1, I describe a method for the objective assessment of the 
levels of e-trust by looking at the implementation of the new definition in a 
distributed artificial system. In section 5, I show how the new model can be used to 
explain more complex occurrences of e-trust, such as those involving human agents 
(HAs). Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. E-trust 
Trusting AAs to perform actions that are usually performed by human agents (HAs) is 
not science-fiction but a matter of daily experience. There are simple cases, such as 
that of refrigerators able to shop online autonomously for our food1, and complex 
ones, such as that of Chicago’s video surveillance network,2 one of the most advanced 
in the US. In the latter case, cameras record what happens, and by matching that 
information with patterns of events such as murder or terrorist attacks, seek to 
recognise dangerous situations. The crucial difference between this system and the 
traditional ones is that it does not require a monitoring HA. In this case, HAs – the 
                                                
1 http://www.lginternetfamily.co.uk/fridge.asp  
2 http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/21/national/21cameras.html  
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entire Chicago police department – trust an artificial system to discern dangerous 
situations from non-dangerous ones. 
In the same way, HAs trust AAs to act in the right way in military contexts. The 
US army used robots ‘Warrior’ and ‘Sword’ in Iran and Afghanistan.3 More 
sophisticated machines are now used at the borders between Israel and Palestine in the 
so-called ‘automatic kill zone’.4 The robots are trusted to detect the presence of 
potential enemies and to mediate the action of the HAs. It is to be hoped that, in a not 
too distant future, we shall trust these robots to distinguish military enemies from 
civilians, and not to fire upon the latter.5 
Even more futuristic are the cases of AAs that trust each other without the 
involvement of HAs. Consider, for example, unmanned aerial vehicles like the 
Predators RQ-1 / MQ-1 / MQ-9 Reaper. These vehicles are “long-endurance, 
medium-altitude unmanned aircraft system for surveillance and reconnaissance 
missions”.6 Surveillance imagery from synthetic aperture radar, video cameras and 
infrared can be distributed in real time to the front line soldier and the operational 
commander, and worldwide, via satellite communication links. The system in the 
vehicle receives and records video signals in the ground control station and can pass 
them to another system, the Trojan Spirit van, for worldwide distribution or directly to 
operational users via a commercial global broadcast system. In this case, there are two 
occurrences of e-trust: that between the artificial system and HAs, and that between 
the artificial systems that manage the data flow. The Predator’s system of data-
collecting trusts the broadcast systems to acquire the data and transmit them to the 
users without modifying or damaging them or disclosing them to the wrong users. 
As the previous examples illustrate, there are at least two kinds of e-trust. In the 
first, HAs trust (possibly a combination of) computational artefacts, a digital devices 
or services, such as a particular website, to achieve a given goal. The users of eBay, 
for example, trust its rating system. In the second, only AAs are involved. This is the 
case of trust in distributed artificial systems.  
This paper is concerned with e-trust between AAs in a distributed system. This 
occurrence of e-trust is simpler to describe and model than those in which HAs are 
                                                
3 http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/08/httpwwwnational.html  
4 http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/06/for_years_and_y.html  
5 http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/06/for_years_and_y.html  
6 http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/predator/  
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involved. This is because trust and e-trust are primarily the consequences of decisions 
made by the trustor. An analysis of e-trust has to make clear the criteria by which an 
agent decides to trust, and this is easier to do for AAs than for HAs, because the 
criteria by which an HA decides to trust are several and heterogeneous (they include 
economic, attitudinarian and psychological factors), and their relevance varies across 
different circumstances. AAs are computational systems situated in a specific 
environment, and able to adapt themselves to changes in it. Since AAs are not 
endowed with mental states, feelings or emotions, psychological and attitudinarian 
criteria are irrelevant. In analysing an AA’s decision process, one knows exactly the 
criteria by which it decides. This is because AAs are artefacts whose criteria are either 
set by the designer or learned following rules set by the designer (Wooldridge 2002).7 
The hope is that, by focusing on such a streamlined and fully-controlled scenario, one 
might be able to identify the fundamental features of e-trust more easily.  
Let us now consider e-trust in more detail. I will begin the analysis of e-trust from 
its foundation: an AA’s trustworthiness. 
 
3. The foundation of e-trust: an objective assessment of trustworthiness 
Trust is often understood as a relation that holds when (a) one of the parts (the trustor) 
chooses to rely on another part (the trustee) to perform a given action, and (b) this 
choice rests on the assessment of the trustee’s trustworthiness. The trustor’s 
assessment of the trustee’s trustworthiness is usually considered the foundation of 
trust and e-trust. It is defined as the set of beliefs that the trustor holds about the 
potential trustee’s abilities, and the probabilities she assigns to those beliefs. This 
definition needs to be revised (reference removed due to double blind review). 
Potential trustors do not consider only their subjective beliefs but also objective 
aspects, such as the results of the performances of the potential trustee. Consider how 
trustworthiness is assessed in online contexts, for example in on-line purchases. It has 
been shown - see (Castelfranchi and Falcone 1998) and (Corritore, Kracher et al. 
2003) - that the potential seller’s trustworthiness is assessed on the basis of well-
                                                
7 AAs are computational systems situated in a specific environment and able to adapt themselves to 
changes in it. They are also able to interact with the environment and with other agents, both human 
and artificial, and to act autonomously to achieve their goals. AAs are not endowed with mental states, 
feelings or emotions. For a more in depth analysis of the features of AAs see Floridi, L. and J. Sanders 
(2004). "On the Morality of Artificial Agents." Minds and Machines 14(3): 349-379. 
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defined and objective criteria (such as previous experiences made with the same 
website, the brand, the technology of the web site, and the seals of approval) that have 
to be met for users to consider the website trustworthy.  
This feature of the trustworthiness’ assessment is well represented in the 
analysis of the model of a distributed system of rational AAs discussed in this paper. 
In order to determine a potential trustee’s trustworthiness, the AAs calculate the ratio 
of successful actions to total number of actions performed by the potential trustee to 
achieve a similar goal. Once determined, this value is compared with a threshold 
value. Only those AAs whose performances have a value above the threshold are 
considered trustworthy, and so trusted by the other AAs of the system.  
The threshold is a parameter that can be either fixed by the designer or 
determined by the AAs of the system on the basis of the mean performance value of 
the AAs. Generally speaking, the threshold has a minimum value below which it 
cannot be moved without imposing a high risk on the trustor. Trustworthiness is then 
understood as a measure that indicates to the trustor the probability of her gaining by 
the trustee’s performances and, conversely, the risk to her that the trustee will not act 
as she expects. The minimum value of the threshold is calculated by considering both 
the risk and the advantage to which a rational AA might be subject in performing a 
given action by itself. The threshold must be higher than this value, because for a 
rational AA it is not convenient to consider as trustworthy an AA that can potentially 
determine a higher risk and an equal advantage to the one that the AA would achieve 
acting by itself. 
Note that the threshold is set higher than the mean value of the AAs’ 
performances. This because the AAs make decisions that, according to their 
information, will best help them to achieve their goals,8 and an AA’s trustworthiness 
is a key factor. 
                                                
8  These AAs are assumed to comply with the axioms of rational choice theory. The axioms are: (1) 
completeness: for any pair of alternatives (x and y), the AA either prefers x to y, prefers y to x, or is 
indifferent between x and y. (2) Transitivity: if an AA prefers x to y and y to z, then it necessarily 
prefers x to z.  If it is indifferent between x and y, and indifferent between y and z, then it is necessarily 
indifferent between x and z. (3) Priority: the AA will choose the most preferred alternative. If the AA is 
indifferent between two or more alternatives that are preferred to all others, it will choose one of those 
alternatives, with the specific choice among them remaining indeterminate. 
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Trustworthiness is the guarantee required by the trustor that the trustee will act as 
it is expected to do without any supervision. In an ideal scenario, rational AAs choose 
to trust only the most trustworthy AAs for the execution of a given task. If threshold 
values are high, then only very trustworthy AAs will be potential trustees, and the risk 
to trustors will be low. This is of course a self-reinforcing process. 
 There are two more points to note. First, the AAs considered in this analysis 
assess trustworthiness with respect to a specific set of actions. For this reason, 
trustworthiness is not a general value: it does not indicate the general reliability of an 
AA, but its dependability for the achievement of a specific (kind of) goal. It might 
happen that an AA that is trustworthy for the achievement of a given goal, such as for 
example collecting the data about the last n online purchases of a user, is not 
trustworthy for another goal, such as guaranteeing the privacy of the same user. 
 Second, e-trust does not occur a priori. A rational AA would not trust another 
AA until its trustworthiness had been assessed. Given that trustworthiness is 
calculated on the basis of the results of performed actions, e-trust could not occur until 
the potential trustees had performed some actions relevant to the matter of the trust in 
its regards. In systems with only rational agents, no agent whose trustworthiness is not 
yet measured is trusted. This implies that there might be cases in which the trustee’s 
trustworthiness has not been assessed with respect to the specific matter of trust. In 
these circumstances the interaction between the two AAs still happens but there is not 
occurrence of e-trust, because the trustor cannot assess the trustee’s trustworthiness. 
Like Crusoe and Friday in Defoe’s book, the two AAs will interact at fist without 
trusting each other. e-Trust will emerge between the two in the curse of time, on the 
basis of results of their previous interactions and if, and only if, the outcomes of the 
trustee’s performances indicate a high level of trustworthiness.  
The reader should recall that the AAs described in this analysis are purely 
rational agents, they could take the risk involved in trusting another agent only if the 
potential trustee can objectively be considered trustworthy. As we shall see in section 
5, a less rational agent might follow different criteria in deciding whether to trust 
another agent. 
One might consider the dependence of the occurrence of e-trust from the 
assessment of the trustee’s trustworthiness as a limit, and object that, since the 
appraisal of trustworthiness presupposes past interactions, it is impossible to explain 
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the occurrence of e-trust in one-shot interactions, which are indeed very common in 
the occurrence of e-trust in a distributed system. 
However, it is important to realize that an agent’s trustworthiness is assessed 
on the agent’s past performances and not on its iterated interactions with the same 
agent. For the assessment of trustworthiness it does not matter whether the trustee 
performed its actions alone or by interacting with the same trustor, or even another 
agent. Trustworthiness is like a chronicle of an agent’s actions, a report that any agent 
of the system considers in order to decide whether to trust that agent. Consider the 
way trustworthiness is assessed in reputation systems, for example in Web of Trust 
(WOT).9 WOT is a website reputation rating system. It combines together ratings 
submitted by individual users about the same trustee to provide community ratings. 
The resulting collective rating is then shared with all the users who can check it before 
deciding to trust a particular agent. In this way, any user has the possibility to assess 
an agent’s trustworthiness even in case of one-shot interaction. 
 On the model I have described, an AA’s trustworthiness is a value determined 
by the outcomes of its performances. The high trustworthiness of an AA guarantees 
its future good behaviour as a potential trustee and is a justification for the trustor to 
take the risk of trusting it. Trustworthiness is like the year of foundation written 
underneath the name of a brand, such as that in Smith & Son 1878. It tells us that 
since 1878, Smith & Son have being doing good work, satisfying their customers and 
making profit, and it is offered as a guarantee that the brand will continue to do 
business in this way. In the same way, an AA’s trustworthiness is a testament to its 
past successes, which is cited as a guarantee of the future results of its actions. This is 
the starting point for the analysis of e-trust that I will provide in the next section. 
 
4. E-trust: a property of relations 
Let me begin by presenting a definition of e-trust that is based on the definition of 
trustworthiness given in the previous section. 
Definition: Assume a set of first-order relations functional to the 
achievement of a goal and that two AAs are involved in the relations, 
such that one of them (the trustor) has to achieve the given goal and 
the other (the trustee) is able to perform some actions in order to 
                                                
9 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WOT:_Web_of_Trust 
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achieve that goal. If the trustor chooses to achieve its goal by the 
action performed by the trustee, and if the trustor rationally selects the 
trustee on the basis of its trustworthiness, then the relation has the 
property of minimising the trustor’s effort and commitment in the 
achievement of that given goal. Such a property is a second-order 
property that affects the first-order relations taking place between 
AAs, and is called e-trust. 
This definition differs from others provided in the literature for three reasons. First, it 
defines e-trust as a second-order property of first-order relations, whereas e-trust is 
classically (if mistakenly) defined as a first-order relation that occurs between agents. 
Second, the definition stresses not only the decisional aspects of trust, but also the 
effects of e-trust on the actions of AAs. Third, the definition highlights the fact that e-
trust is goal-oriented. These features deserve some clarification.  
 Let us first focus on the definition of e-trust as a second-order property of first-
order relations. Consider for example, a MAS in which AAs interact in commercial 
transactions.10 In this case the AAs of the systems are divided in two categories, the 
sellers and the buyers. The sellers put on the market their products and the buyers 
have a set of goods that need to purchase. A seller (B) and a buyer (A) start the 
negotiation process anytime that a seller’s offer satisfies the buyer’s need. The 
negotiation process might occur with or without trust, depending on the 
trustworthiness value associated to the seller.11 According to the definition, when e-
trust occurs, there is a first-order relation, purchasing, which ranges over the two 
agents, and e-trust, which ranges over the first-order relation and affects the way it 
occurs. In symbols, T (P (A, B, g)), where T is the property of e-trust, which ranges 
over the relation P, purchasing, occurring between the agents A and B about some 
good g. Cases like this are usually explained in the literature by arguing that there are 
                                                
10 These systems are widely diffused, there is a plethora of MAS able to perform tasks such as product 
brokering, merchant brokering and negotiation. Such systems are also able to address problems like 
security, trust, reputation, law, payment mechanisms, and advertising. Guttman, R., A. Moukas, et al. 
(1998). "Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: A Survey." Knowledge Engineering Review 13(3): 
147-159. Nwana, H., J. Rosenschein, et al. (1998). Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: Issues, 
Challenges and some Viewpoints. Autonomous Agents 98, ACM Press.  
11 The reader may consider this process similar to the one that occurs in e-commerce contexts where 
HAs are involved, like e-Bay for example. 
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two first-order relations, purchasing and e-trust, occurring at the same time. This 
explanation could be used to argue against the definition of e-trust as a second-order 
property. Let us accept it for a moment. In the case of the example above, we have a 
relation P (A, B, g) and a relation T (A, B), where both P and T range over the two 
AAs. In this case, B is trusted as such, and not merely for the performance of a 
specific action. From the relation T (A,B) it follows that the buyer trusts the seller to 
be able to perform any sort of tasks, from honestly selling its goods to guarantying the 
security of the system or to managing the information flaw in the system. This cannot 
be accepted, it would be like saying that by trusting a seller on e-Bay one also trusts 
that seller to be a good lawyer or a good astronaut.  
One may argue that A generally trusts B to be an honest seller. If this were so, 
e-trust would range over all the first-order relations of selling that occur between A 
and B, where B acts, or is supposed to act, honestly. There is a first-order relation 
between A and B, which occurs every time B acts honestly and which falls in the 
range of T (A, B). But this simply supports the definition that I provided early in this 
section.  
The analysis of e-trust presented in this paper differs from the one provided in 
literature - see (Castelfranchi and Falcone 1998), (Weckert 2005), and (Tuomela and 
Hofmann 2003) - partly because it takes e-trust to be a property of relations. The 
definition states that e-trust affects relations between AAs, minimising the trustor’s 
effort and commitment in achieving a goal. The following example might help to 
explain this. 
Consider again the case of AAs described above. If the buyer trusts the seller, 
and the seller is trustworthy, then purchasing occurs more easily than it would have 
done had the buyer not trusted the seller. The absence of e-trust would force the buyer 
to spend its time looking for information about the seller and about its reliability, 
before purchasing something from that seller.  
E-trust relations minimise the trustor’s effort and commitment in two ways. 
First, the trustor can avoid performing an action because it can count on the trustee to 
do it instead. Second, the trustor does not supervise the trustee’s performances 
without taking a high risk about the trustee’s defection. This is a peculiarity of e-trust 
relations: the absence of supervision is justified there by the trustee’s trustworthiness, 
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which guarantees that the trustee is able to perform a given action correctly and 
autonomously.12  
This minimisation of the trustor’s effort and commitment allows the trustor to 
save time and the energy that it would have spent in performing the action that the 
trustee executes, or in supervising the trustee. 
The level of resource saving is inversely related to the level of e-trust. The 
higher the e-trust in another AA, the less the trustor has to do in order to achieve its 
goal and to supervise the trustee. Hence, the more an AA trusts, the less it spends on 
resources. In this way, e-trust allows the trustor to maximise its gain (by achieving its 
goal) and minimise its loss of resources.  
The inverse relation between the level of e-trust and the level of resource-use 
falls under the mini-max rule.13 On the basis of this rule, e-trust and a trustor’s 
resources are variables of the same system, and are correlated in such a way that the 
growth of one causes the decrease of the other. By using this system and knowing one 
of the variables, it is possible to determine the other. The reader should recall that 
AAs’ resources, time and energy, can be objectively quantified. This allows for an 
objective assessment of the level of e-trust affecting a relation. The model for such an 
assessment is provided in section 4.1. 
Before considering in more details the relation between e-trust and the 
resources of an AA, let us consider the third reason why my definition differs from 
previous ones. This is that it considers e-trust to be goal-oriented. That e-trust is goal-
oriented follows from the teleological orientation of AAs: they act always to achieve 
some goal, and e-trust is part of a strategy for best achieving those goals. It also 
follows from the definition in section 3 of trustworthiness as the ability of an AA to 
achieve a given goal. We can now look at the model. 
 
4.1 An objective model for e-trust levels assessment 
The inverse relation between the level of e-trust and the level of resources can be 
formalised by equating the level of e-trust (y) to the cube of the inverse of the 
                                                
12 Note that “action” indicates here any performance of an AA, from, for example, controlling an 
unmanned vehicle to communicating information or data to another AA. For the role of trust in 
informative processes see (reference removed for double blind review). 
13 As the reader might already know a mini-max rule is a decision rule used in decision and game 
theory. The rule is used to maximise the minimum gain, or inversely to minimise the maximum loss. 
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resources (x): y = (1 - 2x)3. This equation allows one to draw a curve such as the one 
in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Graph showing the levels of e-trust provided by the equation y = (1-2x) 3 
 
The curve goes from the maximum level of e-trust, 1, achieved when the level of 
resources used is equal to 0, to the maximum level of distrust, achieved when the level 
of the resources used is equal to 1. The power has been introduced to account for the 
impact of other factors on the occurrence of e-trust, such as the context, the needs of 
the trustor and the possible urgency of performing an action affected by e-trust. The 
equation can be modified using different odd powers, depending on how much the 
extra factors are supposed to affect the emergence of e-trust. The graph will always 
show a curve going from the maximum level of e-trust to the maximum level of e-
distrust. But, as the reader can see from the graph in Figure 2, the same level of e-trust 
corresponds to different levels of resources with different powers. More precisely, the 
power is an expression of the friendliness of the context. The higher the power, the 
friendlier the context. In a friendly context, AAs are less exposed to dangers, and the 
level of alert and of supervision by an AA of other AAs’ performances is lower. The 
level of resources used to supervise the trustee’s performances counts for more in 
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assessing the level of e-trust. For a higher power (p > 3), the same amount of 
resources corresponds to a lower level of e-trust.  
This model yields both theoretical and practical results. The theoretical results 
are as follows. The graph shows that there are three macro sets of e-trust levels: (y > 
0), (y = 0), and (y < 0). These sets define a taxonomy of e-trust relations allowing for 
a distinction between e-trust positive relations (y > 0), e-trust neutral relations (y = 0), 
and e-trust negative, or e-distrust, relations (y < 0).  
 The presence of e-distrust relation in the taxonomy derived from the model is 
an important feature, for it shows that the definition defended in this article enables us 
to explain the entire range of e-trust relations in one consistent framework. E-distrust 
relations occur when an AA (the dis-trustor) considers the other AA (dis-trustee) 
untrustworthy and hence uses a high level of its resources to supervise (or ultimately 
replace) the dis-trustee’s performances. Again, as the reader can see from the graph in 
figure 1, the level of e-trust is lower than 0, and it decreases with the increase of the 
level of resources used. Hence, e-distrust relations, like e-trust positive and neutral 
relations, fall under the mini-max rule and are in an inverse relation, as described in 
section 4. 
The practical result is that this method can be implemented by systems for e-
trust management in order to determine the level of e-trust occurring in a given 
relation, and to identify cases of distrust. 
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Figure 2 Graph showing the levels of e-trust provided by using the equation y = (1 -2x) with different 
powers. 
 
5. From e-trust to trust 
Now that I have described the definition and model of e-trust in detail, the challenge 
is to extend them to explain more complex occurrences of trust and e-trust, such as 
those in which HAs are involved. In this section, I will briefly sketch how the 
challenge can be met.  
When HAs are involved, the conditions for the emergence of trust are more 
complex. There are various criteria, and they change according to the context and to 
the agents involved. Consider, for example, the case of a rational HA, R, and of a 
gullible HA, G. Agent R trusts her bank to pay her bills automatically. Her trust in 
the bank rests on many criteria, such as information in reviews she read about the 
bank, the good impression she had during a meeting with one of the bank’s 
employees, and the fact that all her bills have been regularly paid so far. R’s goal is 
to have her bills paid and her account properly managed. Now consider agent G, who 
also trusts his bank to pay his bills, but whose trust rests on a different assessment of 
its trustworthiness. G chose a bank indiscriminately, and delegated the bank to pay 
his bills. G’s goal is not to have to care about his bills and about the way the bank 
manages his account. He did not check that the bank would offer a good service. He 
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prefers to take a high risk than be concerned with the trustworthiness of the trustee. 
Generally speaking, an agent like G prefers to trust, because it allows him to delegate 
an action and so not to have to care about it. 
 In the cases of both R and G, there is a first-order relation between an agent and 
the bank. The relation occurs in the way determined by the presence of trust, 
delegation and absence of supervision. What distinguishes the two cases is how the 
trustworthiness of the trustee (the bank) is assessed, and the kind of advantage that is 
conferred by trusting. Given their heterogeneity, the criteria for the assessment of the 
trustworthiness of the bank, and the benefits of trusting cannot be specified a priori. 
They must be specified case by case. This is why it is initially rather difficult to 
extend the definition of e-trust to more complex cases. 
This difficulty can be overcome if we make the definition and the model more 
abstract. Trust and e-trust are still defined as second-order properties of first-order 
relations, able to determine some advantages for the trustor and grounded on the 
assessment of the trustee’s trustworthiness, but the criteria for the assessment of 
trustworthiness and the benefits of trusting are not specified. Their specification is left 
to the analysis of the specific cases, while the definition provides a general framework 
able to explain consistently the occurrences of both trust and e-trust. 
By using the methodology of the levels of abstraction (LoA)14 (Floridi 2008), it is 
possible to set the same definition at different levels of abstraction. From a high LoA, 
the definition does not take into consideration the criteria for the assessment of 
trustworthiness, but focuses only on the more general aspects of trustworthiness as the 
foundation of trust and e-trust. The criteria for assessing trustworthiness are specified 
at a lower LoA. Shifting from higher to lower LoAs is like looking at a map of a city 
first with the naked eye, and then with a magnifying glass. In the first case, one sees a 
                                                
14 In the Theory of Level of Abstraction (LoA), discrete mathematics is used to specify and analyse the 
behaviour of information systems. The definition of a LoA is this: given a well-defined set X of values, 
an observable of type X is a variable whose value ranges over X. A LoA consists of a collection of 
observables of given types. The LoA is determined by the way in which one chooses to describe, 
analyse and discuss a system and its context. A LoA consists of a collection of observables, each with a 
well-defined possible set of values or outcomes. Each LoA makes possible an analysis of the system, 
the result of which is called a model of the system. Evidently, a system may be described at a range of 
LoAs and so can have a range of models. More intuitively, a LoA is comparable to an ‘interface’, 
which consists of a set of features, the observables. 
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general model of a city, which would potentially fit any city. This is like choosing a 
high LoA. If one looks at the map with the magnifying glass, then the map becomes a 
model of just one city. In the same way, at a low LoA the criteria of trustworthiness 
and benefits of trusting are specified, and so the definition at this level fits only a 
specific occurrence of trust or e-trust. At a high LoA the definition becomes: 
Definition: Assume a set of first order-relations functional to the 
achievement of a goal and that at least two agents (AAs or HAs) are 
involved in the relations, such that one of them (the trustor) has to 
achieve the given goal and the other (the trustee) is able to perform 
some actions in order to achieve that goal. If the trustor chooses to 
achieve its goal by the action performed by the trustee, and if the 
trustor considers the trustee a trustworthy agent, then the relation has 
the property of being advantageous for the trustor. Such a property is 
a second-order property that affects the first-order relations taking 
place between AAs, and is called trust. 
This definition nowhere specifies criteria for the assessment of 
trustworthiness or the benefits of trust or e-trust in absolute terms. This 
general definition is the right definition of trust. 
 
6. Conclusion  
At the beginning of this paper I mentioned three aspects of the occurrence of e-trust 
that need to be taken in account by any analysis addressing this phenomenon: (i) the 
reasons for which an AA decides to trust, (ii) the effects of e-trust on the behaviour 
of the trustor, and (iii) the role of e-trust in the development of social interactions in 
distributed systems. The analysis of e-trust presented here contributes to explain all 
of these aspects.  
In section 4 it has been shown that e-trust determines some advantages for the 
trustor and the achievement of its goal. The advantage is assessed considering the 
minimisation of the resources, i.e. time and energy, that the trustor spends in the 
process of accomplish its goal due to the presence of e-trust. Such advantage should 
be considered the reason for which a rational AA decides to trust another AA and take 
the (low) risk of being betrayed by the trustee. The choice to trust is simply the most 
convenient one, when the potential advantage determined by this choice is high and 
the potential risk of being deceived by the trustee is low. 
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The facilitating effect of e-trust also contributes to clarify the effects of e-
trust on the trustor’s behaviour. Once the trustor has chosen the trustee, then it can 
delegate the accomplishment of a given task to the trustee without having to 
supervise the other AA’s performance. Delegation and absence of supervision should 
be considered, according to the analysis presented in this paper, the effects of e-trust 
on the trustor’s behaviour. 
Finally, if one considers the advantages determined by the occurrence of e-
trust from a system-wise perspective then the role of e-trust in the development of 
social interactions in distributed systems becomes clearer. In section 1, I presented 
trust as a fundamental feature of social life, e-trust should be considered a 
phenomenon of the same importance for the development of social interactions in 
digital contexts. Such a fundamental role is a consequence of the benefits that e-trust 
confers on the trustor, as it makes advantageous for the agent who decides to trust to 
get involved in some relationships or in a net of relationships like a social system.  
 Going back to Hobbes, the advantages arising from mutual trust amongst the 
agents of a group are the reasons for choosing to end the status of bellum omnium 
contra omnes and establish a society. When e-trust occurs one can outsource part of 
one’s duties to other agents and focuses on what one values more. e-Trust plays the 
same role in digital contexts, it promotes the delegation of tasks among the AAs of a 
system, in doing so it effectively reduces the complexity of the system (Luhmann 
1979)  and favours the development of social interactions. 
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